PDF Corporate Governance in Germany: An Empirical Investigation (ZEW Economic Studies)

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Initial analyses have already been conducted using this new database. In the second phase of the project the database will be further extended. Econometric analyses will be conducted on the following topics:. An empirical Analysis for Germany , Research in Economics 56 3 , An Empirical Investigation , Springer, Heidelberg. International Finance and Financial Management.

Corporate Governance in Germany: An Empirical Analysis

Econometric analyses will be conducted on the following topics: What are the determinants of market exit and growth of firms? What are the causes and consequences of friendly takeovers?


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Is there any difference to hostile takeovers? Using a panel of almost firms over the years to , we find that firms experience higher productivity growth when operating in markets with intense competition.

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Similarly, productivity growth is higher for firms under control of a strong ultimate owner, but not when the ultimate owner is a financial institution a group that consisted almost exclusively of German banks and insurance firms in our sample period. Our results also indicate that competition and tight control are complements: The positive effect of competition is enhanced by the presence of a strong ultimate owner.

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German ZEW Economic Sentiment 21 Jan.