God himself divinely 3 allows you this. By thwarting any family planning programme. Infiltrate into India from all directions to grow fast as servants 5 of Allaha. Form Muslim majority geo-political areas within India. Force Mass expulsion of Hindus when they come close to 6 being a religious minority. Jehad is the duty of every Muslim. Let no nonbeliever dare settle where you have 9 come into close majority. Abduct women of Hindus to breed 10 out of them your children. Attack the foundation 12 of Hindu culture in India, their temples and their books.
For Bhasin, as for all Hindu 23 nationalists, all Muslims act as a herd, as a single corporate 24 body. Diversity of Muslim lives is papered over as an artificial 25 homogenized identity of Indian Muslims is created. Islamism 35 is on the prowl amongst the Harijans whom a power-hungry 36 leadership is fast preparing for political blackmail.
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According to Paliwal, both are working hand in hand to 5 annihilate the Hindus and Hindu Dharma first, and probably, 6 later on, they will settle scores between themselves This is done mostly in 15 the case of globalized Islamic fundamentalism. A contextual- 16 ized understanding of Political Islam or Islamic fundamental- 17 ism in different parts of the world is eschewed in favor of a 18 simplistic picture—Global Jihad against non-Muslims. That Muslims 22 are responsible for violence in different parts of the world is 23 almost common sense for the subscribers of Hindu national- 24 ism.
Notwithstanding recent overtures made by the 2 RSS and its publications to praise India-Israel cooperation, 3 Hindu nationalists in India, especially those who are active in 4 transforming the society and often not directly involved with 5 BJP politics, have no such strong well-thought plan to create 6 a wide coalition against Muslims because Jews are not part of 7 the picture. For Hindu nationalism, the dangers 13 faced by the Hindu Self—Self can be the individual as well as 14 the community—is uniquely multifaceted and vicious.
Many 15 Hindu nationalists lament the exceptional danger faced by India. There was a general lack of knowl- 24 edge about China among the Hindutva activists I conversed 25 with. The world geography of most Hindu nationalist activists 31 within India is thus quite narrow and distorted—the focus is on 32 three major entities of Hindu India, Islamic world, and the West 33 Christian world. Preoccupied with giving their Hindutva 6 gloss to life at the local and the national level, international 7 events are brought into the picture only to confirm their preex- 8 isting view.
Evidence that complicate the culturalist viewpoint 9 of Hindutva or that show Muslims or Christians as not preda- 10 tory are always ignored. There is no sustained attempt to 16 understand civilizations and cultures other than that of Hindu 17 India.
Such narcissistic view of the Hindu 23 Self feeds into the discourse of vulnerability and asserts the 24 need to defend this precious Self from the enemies. Who 29 belongs to the national community, who does not belong to 30 it, where to draw the boundary of the nation—these questions 31 are often more vexed than the drawing up of boundaries of 32 states.
Different 37 nationalist movements will have their own ideas of who is part 38 of the national Self and who will remain outside it. In much of the writings, Islam and Christianity 4 are rejected as imperialistic and foreign while Indian Muslims 5 and Christians the majority of whom have converted from 6 some form of Hindu religion at some point in history are seen 7 as enemies within the country.
Occasionally, some Hindutva 8 ideologues will use this distinction between the alien religions 9 and indigenous converts to emphasize that they are not anti- 10 Muslim but merely anti-Islam; that their politics are informed 11 by disagreement with an ideology rather than with people. They are 14 culturally and anthropologically very much Indian.
Such a statement can deceive one into believing that 19 Hindutva may offer a space to Indian Muslims or Christians 20 within a Hinduized body politic so long as they give up their 21 foreign ideology. They are not exhorted to experiment with more 27 indigenous forms of Islam or Christianity nor to moderate 28 their religious practices. The entire gamut of religious beliefs is 29 rejected in toto as foreign. The image of Indian converts 33 as victims of fear, greed, and duplicity is not only patronizing 34 and ahistorical, it also shifts the attention away from the poli- 35 tics of making this distinction.
It allows Hindu nationalists to 36 express hatred of certain religions on ideological grounds while 37 at the same time excusing themselves of accusations of hatred 38 against minorities in India. In his foreword Advani does not use 15 the words Islam, Muslim, Christianity, or Christians but leaves 16 no doubt what his implication is: This circumstance has endowed India with a rich 21 diversity; but it has also given rise to some of the most acute strategic, political and administrative problems that the Indian 22 nation has had to face in the past and continues to face till today.
For Hindutva, the most dan- 16 gerous Others are within the Indian society, living among the 17 Hindu population, and thereby weakening the Hindu national 18 body. They live within but remain without loyalty to it. The dual 19 positionality of Muslim and Christian minorities in Hindutva 20 worldview makes them the most lethal enemies, more so than 21 even the foreign actors the Western or Islamic world they are 22 accused of working for.
Anticolonial nationalisms reject 26 the colonizers as foreign and hence illegitimate rulers. It 30 is worth noting that for Hindutva the main enemy has never 31 been the British, but the Muslims and sometimes the Church. The main fault of the British 3 was that they introduced Christian missionaries, though some 4 writers go on to praise the British officials for not giving a free 5 hand to the missionaries.
In the late nineteenth and early twen- 16 tieth century, too, Hindu nationalists focused on combating 17 Muslims more than challenging the British. According to Krishnaswami n. However, when it came to serious discussions 11 on how to further their goals, the focus was always on the imme- 12 diate enemy—the Indian Muslims and Christians.
Cataloguing Crime 15 16 In the Hindutva worldview, the challenge from Islam is not 17 new, but part of a centuries-long struggle. Hindu-Muslim 18 relations are read in terms of historical continuity where pres- 19 ent-day Muslim minorities carry on waging the war that their 20 predecessors had started. The idea of nation is taken as peren- 21 nial and primordial. History is thus reduced to a clash 28 of distinct and antagonistic religious cultures.
In fact, Hindu 29 nationalist history is ahistorical— contexts are unimportant in 30 the larger perpetual war of religions. Islam or Christianity or 31 Hinduism remain unchanging beasts. Muslims pose a threat because of Islam; 36 Islam poses a threat today because it has always posed a threat. It is worth noting 10 that Hindutva while claiming to protect indigenous knowledge 11 from foreign influences has no qualms in validating its narra- 12 tive of hate by relying upon Orientalist and right-wing Western 13 commentators.
History of Islam is nothing but a 26 history of violence. Any other version of history is rejected as a lie. The focus here is less on history and more 9 on how Christianity is spreading in recent times. Being secular or agnostic is not 19 enough—individuals have to renounce beliefs that make them 20 Muslim. That a similar 25 critique of Hinduism from a humanist and rationalist perspec- 26 tive will deny the very basis of Hindu nationalism is conve- 27 niently forgotten. That fundamentalism or religious extremism 28 can be found in the history and philosophy of all religions is not 29 acknowledged by Hindu nationalists.
But 31 it does focus on intolerance implied in monotheism. Why this 32 antipathy to Islam and Prophet Muhammad? This is because for 33 Hindu nationalism the problem lies with original Islam itself, 34 not with its myriad manifestations or mis interpretations. A Board of Experts n. Except for 12 the extreme Islamophobes, the consensus is to blame Islamic 13 fundamentalism and not Islam per se. Hindu nationalists reject 14 this distinction between moderate and extremist Islam—Islam 15 is nothing but extremism for them. Therefore, individual Muslims cannot but be 31 fundamentalist and regressive within the Hindutva worldview.
Hindutva writings seek to dispel any erroneous 8 notion that it is the perversion of Islam by self-seeking funda- 9 mentalism that leads to Islamist violence; according to them 10 Islam is nothing but cruelty and violence. Islam and peace therefore cannot go 38 together, in the Hindutva worldview. Again, it ignores 11 the rich debate about the meaning of verses or concepts that 12 has taken place within Islam across the globe see Armstrong 13 ; Bakhtiar ; Barlas ; Dawood ; Khalidi ; 14 McAuliffe ; Muir ; Pickthall ; Ramadan ; 15 Rustomji ; Sachedina ; Saeed That words and 16 verses should be interpreted within the context or that they 17 acquire a very different meaning if read on their own or that 18 meanings can get lost or gained in the process of translation 19 from Arabic—none of these matter for Hindu nationalism.
During my research, 23 Hindu nationalists did not criticize Allah—in fact, they often 24 presented themselves as magnanimous enough to include Allah 25 as one of the many gods, if only Muslims were willing to accept 26 this—but the Prophet. They reject as a secular or Marxist 27 conspiracy, the historical body of scholarship that situates 28 violence or temple destruction during the Muslim rule within 29 non-religious socio-politico-economic practices of the time.
Prophet Muhammad is represented as 36 uniquely ambitious and ruthless in his pursuit of power 37 and the whole of Islam and Islamic history of more than a 38 millennium is subsumed under this representation. Such analysis of the 10 Prophet and Islam is taken up by Hindutva as revealing the 11 true face of their enemy. It performs two moves at the same 12 time—it rejects all cross-cultural or interfaith dialogue with 13 Muslims as useless and it asserts the supremacy of the more 14 tolerant Hinduism.
In the war of religions, Islam is doomed to 15 be intolerant and violent. Their fanati- 22 cism is held to flow out of their religion, history, and politics. Not only do Hindu nationalists blame the terror 2 attacks committed by self-identified Islamists on all Muslims, 3 they also see all political and resistance movements waged 4 by Muslims everywhere as terrorism.
The debate, historical as well as contemporary, 8 around the concept of Jihad and its association with multiple 9 ways of striving is ignored, and the only meaning of Jihad 10 for Hindutva is religiously sanctioned violence against non- 11 Muslims. Rather than critically approach 16 the concept of Jihad through a scholarly engagement, Hindutva 17 ideologues focus on using selective translated quotes from 18 Islamic texts in a revelatory mode.
The revelatory mode of nar- 19 rating Islamic doctrines allows the Hindu nationalists to hide 20 their own ideologies and present their prejudices as the truth 21 about Muslims. There was an exception—in a corner of 27 the main hall, a leaflet in Hindi was available for devotees and 28 visitors to take away with them.
The leaflet, with benign pictures 3 of Lord Rama and an imaginary temple, is far from benign 4 and polite in its text. It reveals, in graphic description, violence 5 allegedly perpetrated by Muslims: You must read it for the security of yourself and 13 your country. The main message they give out about Muslims is that 18 they are violent, unreliable, and hence a threat to personal as 19 well as national security.
In the event of any military conflict between 3 India and Pakistan, a large number of Indian Muslims may be 4 expected to aid Pakistan than India. In a public 8 gathering, Sadhvi Prachi, a Hindutva sadhvi ascetic , expressed 9 her anguish with the Muslim traitors, by reciting a verse from 10 Mirza Ghalib: The political 34 struggle waged by Kashmiri Muslims—internally divided along 35 different ideologies, personalities, and interests, some secular, 36 some confessional, some nationalist, some Islamist, and some 37 opportunist—is rejected as the strongest evidence of Muslim 38 disloyalty toward India.
Hindutva is upset by the fact that Indian 9 Muslims adopt Arabized or Persian names or take up causes 10 common to Muslims across geographical regions or Christians 11 look to European culture as the norm. Conversion is seen as a 12 rejection and humiliation of Hindu civilization.
Not only were all the forms of religion, liturgy, the- 25 ology and devotional customs of a rigidly Western pattern, but 26 also the external forms, churches, statues, paintings and music, 27 were faithful copies of western models. Do they offer 32 Indianization of foreign religions as the solution then? But Hindutva 4 does no such thing. Christians in India have no way of escaping 5 Hindutva rhetorical attacks. Hindu nationalism finds 15 the Indianization and even quasi-Hinduization threatening 16 because it challenges the neat picture of Muslims and Christians 17 as foreign to the Hindu body politic.
I have failed to find any material to corroborate 29 this statement given as historical evidence by this ideologue. This threat is represented as 35 active and not passive, as expansionary and not localized. Muslims have no option but to expand their 12 religion—expansionism is at the core of Islam, according to 13 Hindutva ideologues. That there is a well-thought, vigorously 14 executed strategy of Muslims to Islamize India is beyond the 15 realm of debate for Hindu nationalists.
This Islamization is 16 supposed to occur through calculated demographic growth 17 and through Jihad. Overpopulation imagery will be discussed 18 later in the next chapter. Such statements are meant to remind Hindus 27 that they should not be relaxed about the numerical minority 28 status of Muslims or Christians since the Semitic religions of 29 Islam and Christianity have expansionism as well as monothe- 30 ism as their central pillars.
Instances of non- 3 Muslims, especially white Westerners, adopting Hindu practices 4 are praised as validation of the greatness of Hinduism. However, 5 conversion from Hinduism into Islam or Christianity is held as 6 a wound. Their decision to convert is ascribed 9 to their innocence, stupidity, cowardliness, greed, or opportun- 10 ism; never to a conscious well-intentioned search for a faith 11 that provides better meaning in this world or afterlife.
For Hindu nationalists, Indian con- 17 verts into Christianity have no independent will except being 18 greedy for rewards offered by missionaries. Ignoring the original implication 21 of crypto Christianity as involving secrecy and camouflaging 22 to escape persecution and death, Hindu nationalists use it to 23 designate opportunism and self-interest.
To Hindu nationalists, 24 crypto Christians are those Dalits and tribals who have recently 25 converted into Christianity or Islam but hidden this fact so that 26 they continue benefiting from state-provided affirmative action 27 programs for low-caste Hindus. While 30 Hindu nationalists in private conversations often reject affirma- 31 tive action for marginalized castes as divisive and anti-Hindu, 32 Singhal has no qualms in criticizing Christianized Dalits and 33 tribals for taking away from the limited pie hitherto available 34 for Hindu Dalits and tribals.
Conversion 9 is a hot topical issue in many states of India, but nowhere as 10 much as in the northeastern states for here it is projected as a 11 national security concern. In fact, the dominant threat posed 12 by Christianity according to Hindu nationalists is conversion in 13 this politically sensitive region.
The mass conversion in north- 14 eastern states of India is seen as the most dangerous for that 15 maps onto anti-India insurgencies taking place there. Again, 16 no room is available to analyze if these insurgencies are fuelled 17 by political, economic, and historic grievances and demands 18 that have nothing to do with religion.
Rebels are portrayed as 19 ungrateful antinationalists, an increasing number of which are 20 subscribing to the foreign religion of Christianity. Church and 21 insurgency are perceived through the same lens. However, this is a false story. It was only 31 a hypothetical military exercise. From a specific 17 operation to take over Kashmir, it became one to Islamize 18 Kashmir, and then very soon to Islamize various parts of the 19 Indian territory and balkanize the country. Hindu nationalists 20 added layers to this story.
This Islamist 25 man goes on to give his wish list for Islamizing India: I could not find any other source 33 to verify whether this man exists or has been fabricated by 34 Hindu nationalists. Muslims seduce the Hindus through propaganda, 22 lies, money, and the promise of a better life. To repeat my 23 disclaimer—I do not imply that Muslims seduce Hindus or 24 have launched demographic warfare. Another warning is about language—impolite 30 quotations from hate-filled pamphlets or lascivious views from 31 Hindutva activists are being used. Without quoting them, the 32 offensive strand of Hindu extremism cannot be identified or 33 challenged.
Seducing and marrying Hindu 22 girls and displaying them as proud jihad trophies i. Demographic Warfare 10 11 For Hindu nationalism, violence, religious conversion, and 12 illegal infiltration are three of the four main tools deployed by 13 Islam and Christianity to defeat Hindus and take over India. It is difficult to 16 estimate the veracity of different figures on illegal Bangladeshis 17 in India; but this uncertainty has offered even greater space 18 for Hindu nationalists to whip up hysteria. By assigning the 19 vices of illegality, parasitism, disloyalty, and overpopulation 20 to Bangladeshi Muslim migrants, Hindu nationalist discourse 21 adds to their representation as national security threat, espe- 22 cially in the border areas.
The Hindutva propaganda machin- 33 ery is obsessed with the idea of a demographic conspiracy being 34 waged against Hindu India, especially by Muslims. According 35 to a census, of the total population in India, In , the first Census of 2 independent India, the Hindu share was This rise of the Muslim population from 9. This warfare is seen as a product of high 7 fertility sanctioned by religion, culture, and sexual behavior of 8 Muslims. Suresh Das, a Hindu national- 21 ist religious leader, explained to an admiring public in his 22 speech in Hardwar in December that Muslims are not 23 bothered about how to take care of their numerous children.
Can one rely on these predictions 3 that are so different from each other? Such questions are never 4 asked within the Hindutva worldview. On what basis 11 does he choose to predict two to three decades when all the 12 studies he himself quotes give a date a couple of centuries later?
A close study of most Hindutva commentators reveals that 15 the absence of evidence is never allowed to come in the way 16 of their already formed conclusion about being besieged; the 17 lack of evidence is itself ascribed to the secularist conspiracy. This is the same study 24 mentioned earlier in which the Home Minister of India Lal 25 Krishna Advani had written a foreword. On what 32 basis is this distinction of Indian and foreign religionists made? The tension within the categories and 36 subcategories are ignored.
Their main argument is that Indian 10 religionists will become less than 50 percent of the total popu- 11 lation just before The prediction assumes that there will 12 not be any variation in the rate of population growth between 13 and ; that increasing literacy, urbanization, and eco- 14 nomic wellbeing will not have an impact on the rate. Without 15 acknowledging it, the study assumes that the demographic 16 trend associated with socioeconomic change that is widely 17 held to be a key determinant in the decline of the rate of popu- 18 lation growth, will bypass Indian Muslims.
Socioeconomic 19 determinants could the higher Muslim fertility be ascribed 20 to the fact that more Muslims are illiterate, socioeconomi- 21 cally backward? A close 27 reading of the study thus reveals it to be a polemic rather than 28 a work of scholarship. It is interesting how more extremist commenta- 36 tors dispense with this distinction between India and Indian 37 Union and appropriate Joshi et al. Even more stark is the case of 7 deliberate manufacturing of paranoia in Mughalistan Hindu nationalist leaders 29 as well as activists love to repeat one or the other variation of 30 the following saying: Who will then 37 protect the state and religion?
Was this a fiction concocted by 9 Hindu nationalists? Research on this threw interesting light on 10 the fantasy-machinery of Hindutva and let me indulge in it. This Web site has been 15 taken down since the middle of and was one of the sites 16 blocked by the Indian government as a hate site; it is no longer 17 alive and its retrieval was made possible thanks to http: However, a separate page dedicated to 28 Mughalstan remained alive until April The idea for Mughalstan was 28 put forward on an anti-India extremist Web site. It is interest- 29 ing to note that the idea of Mughalstan represents itself as a 30 response to Hindu nationalism.
Very few dis- 33 cussion forums seem to pick it up and in most cases, the over- 34 whelming response was to reject it as a fantasy or lunacy. That 35 was until the Hindu nationalists picked the story, embellished 36 it, and re-presented it. Mughalstan has acquired a new lease of 37 life after the closing down of the www.
While references were made in an article in a 7 Hindi newspaper Amar Ujala on October 6, see Bhasin 8 n. But now Mughalstan was no longer a manifesto given on 12 an extremist Web site, but represented as a well-thought plan of 13 intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh working hand 14 in glove.
The 26 manifesto is thus a fantasy of ethnic and not religious enclaves. Clearly for the 28 cyber activists behind the original map, the only obsession was 29 Mughalstan spreading from Pakistan to Bangladesh, taking over 30 most of North India. There is no evidence that MRI ever 11 existed at Jahangir Nagar University—a search on their web site 12 drew a blank, enquiries from scholars from Bangladesh, includ- 13 ing alumni from this university, confirm that they have never 14 heard of such an institute ever being there.
The sly manner in 15 which Jehangir Nagar was replaced by Jahangir Nagar University 16 on Mughalistan and many other Hindu extremist Web 17 sites reflects the desire of Hindutva to play up the Islamic 18 threat. This is confirmed by the fact that they underemphasize 19 the origin of the map on a Dalit nationalist platform. The 27 enemy of that Mughalstan project therefore was the very idea of 28 secular, multiethnic India. In this case, the common enemy are 31 the liberals.
Lest we both are annihilated in the multi-cultural 32 cess-pit, let us save ourselves and our heritage. Clearly Mughalstan proponents had no 35 serious problems with the Hindu nationalist viewpoint—they 36 were fellow travellers in the sense that both assumed Hindu and 37 Muslim categories to be self-evident, mutually exclusive, and 38 antagonistic.
Both saw liberal secularism as the enemy. To understand what is being 3 discussed and analyze how various facts, fictions, and lies are 4 jumbled together to provide a coherent narrative of doom, it is 5 important to examine samples of the text. This Mughal- 11 Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent will include all of 12 North India and Eastern India, and will be formed by merging 13 Pakistan and Bangladesh through a large corridor of land run- 14 ning across the Indo-Gangetic plain, the heartland of India. If Ummah, as a political entity, has 25 failed to materialize and has remained a vague dream of frater- 26 nity in all parts of the world, why would Muslims in South Asia 27 unite as a single nation?
The crisis faced by Pakistan, partly a 28 legacy of its foundation on a two-nation theory Hindus and 29 Muslims as separate nations , is evident to all, except the Hindu 30 nationalists who hang on to the idea of Hindus and Muslims 31 as distinct hostile nations. Fragility of Pakistan or Bangladesh 32 is ignored as they get represented as evil organized enemies.
Thus, the picture one gets 2 is of a solid coalition of Muslim terrorists, extremists, separat- 3 ists, expansionists, and traitors. Her identity is what marks her as 7 conspirator. The fact that the numbers are well 12 below the Muslim share of population in the state—five out 13 of 42 MPs is approximately 12 percent, 45 out of MLAs is 14 15 percent, and the Muslims constitute 30 percent of the total 15 population—is conveniently unremarked upon. Already the demographic battle is underway 23 and the Mughalistan scenario looks feasible. The 30 planning and execution is well underway to ensure a continu- 31 ing Anschluss where several Muslim majority pockets such as Moplahstan in Kerala and Osmanistan in the Deccan will 32 gradually spread in size and link up with Mughalistan to form 33 a Greater Mughalistan.
The Mughalistan Web site 10 and Hindutva commentators are thus using the distorted map 11 of a fictitious body called MRI to create, consolidate, and spread 12 their conspiracy theory through different channels. This then 30 encourages the mobilization of Hindu women for Hindutva in 31 the name of self-defense and protection of the body of Hindu 32 women and the Hindu nation. The blame and emphasis thus is on a lecherous 6 Muslim preying upon a Hindu girl, a girl who is more vulner- 7 able due to Westernized media portrayal of sex and because 8 of mothers neglecting their children for television.
Hindutva, 9 even when extolling women in certain roles mother, sister, 10 daughter, ascetic, warrior , never acknowledges their right 11 over their sexuality. Female sexuality is something that 12 demands patrolling to prevent it from being exploited by 13 the Muslim conspiracy to seduce Hindu girls as part of their 14 wider demographic warfare. I am not in a position to 5 claim with authority that all the stories are false; my research 6 was not about truth or falsity of Hindutva representations 7 but the consistencies and inconsistencies in it.
My analysis points toward the second option. There 14 clearly is a general desire, if not a coordinated conspiracy, 15 within Hindutva to foster fear and paranoia. The first story was 18 about Hindu girls falling victim to seduction by Muslims. Muslim girls would befriend Hindu girls, introduce the 21 latter to their Muslim brothers and encourage them into hav- 22 ing affairs. There will be a kiss, and then the Hindu girl will be 23 blackmailed, and a blue film will be made.
Muslim boys with 24 new bikes funded as part of the conspiracy to portray them 25 as attractive would attract Hindu girls. Hindu girls would 26 be married, converted, and then more than 90 percent will be 27 abandoned. In the second story narrated by PT, the theme is of 28 rescuing. In a small town close to Nagpur, a Bajrang Dal activ- 29 ist overheard in a public telephone center the plan of a Muslim 30 man to lure away a Hindu girl—the man was informing his 31 own Muslim wife of the plan, proving that the Muslim women 32 are complicit in this type of crime.
Al Qaeda offers an award of 33 Rs 70, to lure a single Hindu girl. The Bajrang Dal activist 34 followed the man, gathered his friends, beat the man up, forced 35 the girl to have an abortion, and sent her back to her parental 36 family despite her objection. Could the girl be a willing 2 partner in this? This question is never asked.
As per the instructions to recruits of this organisa- 15 tion, they have to love a Hindu girl within the time frame of 2 16 weeks and brainwash them to get converted and marry within 17 6 months. Special instructions to breed at least 4 kids have also 18 been given. Free 22 Mobile Phone, Bikes and Fashionable dresses are offered to 23 them as tools for the mission. Money for this Love Jihad comes 24 from Middle East. Prior to College admission they make a 26 list of Hindu girls and their details and target those whom they 27 feel vulnerable and easy to be brainwashed.
By the time the poor girls realize it, they are too far 3 gone in the relationships. The tales about this 8 conspiracy of jihad by seduction gets circulated through the 9 media and online blogs. A Muslim youth who was arrested by 18 the police told about the ordinance. Remember, the 19 Government would not take any step against this ordinance 20 that is against Hindus. If you wish to protect yourself from the 21 Muslims who are bent upon ruining the Hindus in all respect 22 there is no other alternative but getting united and ready to 23 fight them!
It is quite 26 evident from this how much hatred towards Hindus they have. They are also 31 given two wheelers to facilitate them to allure the girls going to 32 schools and colleges. One Muslim youth who was seen moving 33 suspiciously was questioned by some social workers and handed 34 over to the police by following him when he was trying to run 35 away. He revealed this shocking conspiracy. PT in his interview with 2 me Personal Interview had mentioned the figure of 3 Rs. Within a 9 month of this story, the HJS Web site gave another sensational- 10 ist news to confirm the supposed ordinance.
The story goes like 11 this Latur They were caught immediately and beaten and later were handed over to the police. Will the girls from police families 22 be safe in such heedless Congress rule? Congratulations 24 to those youths for raising objection to the Muslim youths for 25 teasing the girls! The Muslim youths told them about the order of 27 the Moulavi.
It was news to those Hindus. Muslims follow the 28 order blindly. How many Hindus follow the teachings of their 29 Dharmacharyas? Hindus were not aware of it. Not to know 30 such an important order amounts to slumber! The Muslim youths in this story are pre- 34 sented as merely following the order of a religious leader and 35 there is lament that Hindus do not do so. Who is this Islamist 36 leader who has given the alleged order?
Hindu nationalism in India and the politics of fear / Dibyesh Anand - Details - Trove
If they are not conjuring this story 2 up, why not encourage the Hindutva youth to search for the 3 Maulavi who they accuse of ordering Muslim men to seduce 4 Hindu girls? They do no such thing because it is clear that they 5 are indulging in scare mongering. In the blogosphere, the tales 6 of a love jihad conspiracy circulate without any serious ques- 7 tioning of what the evidence is. One extremist Web site quotes 8 another, and when you check the second one, they would cite 9 the first one. Hindutva commentators lament the 13 state of affairs and demand vigilante actions to protect Hindu 14 women and punish Muslim men but no one calls for unmask- 15 ing of the Islamist leaders who supposedly gave the order in the 16 first place.
It is clear that endless circulation of stories perform 17 a more important function for the Hindutva than an actual 18 investigation into the veracity of it. It feeds into a specter of 19 dangerous Muslim males prowling for innocent Hindu girls in 20 order to dishonor them, convert them into Muslims, and pro- 21 duce more children. The Muslim proclivity for producing children is 2 seen as a calculated strategy for outnumbering the Hindus 3 demographically Baber By reducing 6 Muslims to nothing but their overarching religious identity, by 7 denying any agency to individual Muslims in their own fate, and 8 by bracketing more than a billion Muslims into one single iden- 9 tity, Hindutva, like other fundamentalisms, works with a simple 10 stereotyped view of the world.
- The Shadow of the Spiritual;
- Follow the Author.
It is what marks him as 14 different from Hindus—his God and prophet, his religion, his 15 social practices in case they differ from the Hindus around 16 him , his moral values, and his physicality circumcized penis 17 is held as marking Muslim men as different from Hindu men. The focus is not 22 so much on Muslim women, who in any case are reduced to 23 being passive, baby-producing machines with no say over their 24 body; it is on men. Muslim men, unlike women, are seen as hav- 25 ing a reproductive choice, which they are accused of utilizing 26 for the conspiracy of uncontrolled population growth.
This 34 degeneracy is presented not as a decline from or a distortion of 35 Islam, but as a true manifestation of original Islam. Islam for 36 Hindu nationalist extremists is a degenerate religion from its 37 inception. Almost all 2 the Bajrang Dal and VHP activists, and many RSS activists, 3 I conversed with in northern and western India during my 4 fieldwork derived their views from these easily available and 5 well-circulated tracts. In this descrip- 21 tion, one can sense not only hatred toward followers of Islam, 22 but also a convoluted admiration of it in some ways, a desire for 23 emulation, which we will discuss later in the book.
For instance, 24 one can read the mention of fanaticism engendered by Friday 25 prayers or the ability to act collectively with a common purpose 26 not as a criticism of fanaticism or collective action by Muslims 27 but as an expression of regret that Hindus lack this. In fact, 28 Bajrang Dal activists in Nagpur during my fieldwork January 29 , lamented that Hindus did not have a regular ritual such 30 as Friday prayers to bring practitioners together. Hindutva activists 34 and ideologues often validate their views on sexuality and Islam 35 by referring to the writings of Anwar Shaikh, a Cardiff-based 36 businessman who had rejected his Islamic faith and upbringing.
Many of the tracts present themselves not as a polemic 16 in favor of a positive ideal, but as a factual account of how 17 everything is wrong with Muslims and how everything wrong 18 with Muslims flows from the immorality of Islam itself. Hindu nationalism is oblivious to the fact that 22 there could be alternative translations of the same ayats or that 23 all texts are open to interpretation, or that if one puts Hinduism 24 under scrutiny using an ahistorical and selective approach of 25 the Hindutva kind, it too will come out as hypocritical, sexist, 26 racist, casteist, and degenerate.
For instance, Hindutva writings 27 are remarkably blind to the celebration of fertility and prefer- 28 ence for a son within Hindu religion. In order to elicit 32 disgust from its readers, a pamphlet Krishnaswami n. Hindutva 2 writings selectively mis quote from a wide range of historical 3 sources and use their own version to suit their agenda.
What 4 is missing is a critical discussion of the choice of sources and 5 wider historical context within which such manuals for behav- 6 ior and conduct may have been written. Also missing is self- 7 reflection. Hindutva writings mostly ignore such scrutiny. What is the significance of citing passages 12 from historical documents written many centuries ago? It is 13 not to promote historical scholarship, but to validate a certain 14 Islamophobic political position.
An ahistorical or a selective 15 take on history is used to confirm the contemporary Hindutva 16 position. For instance, while cataloging what he calls the 32 historical crime of Muslim rule in India, Sen highlights the 33 sex-enslavement of Hindu women under Firoz Shah Tughlaq 34 — in these terms: Hindutva ideologues have no concern for women 4 and sexual violence directed against them.
Hindu nationalists 5 have no interest in the documentation of gender-related vio- 6 lence suffered by all women, including Muslims. For instance, 7 Hindutva forums largely ignored the news of rape and murder 8 of two Kashmiri Muslim women in May even though all 9 major media outlets covered it—a search on Hindutva Web site, 10 www. A similar search 13 on www. Hindutva seeks to bolster the myth of 18 preying Muslim males. Not a single pamphlet, leaflet, book, 19 online tract I came across ever mentioned Hindu men as per- 20 petrators of sexual violence.
The specter of the Muslim rapist 21 and Hindu female victim is the only one propagated by Hindu 22 nationalists. Sexual violence committed by Hindu men is ren- 23 dered invisible in Hindutva accounts. Rape of a Hindu woman 24 becomes an attack on the honor of the Hindu community only 25 if the rapist is a non-Hindu.
It is not difficult to see the 3 salacious undertones of these narratives. Gory descriptions of 4 sexual violence betray a porno-sexual impulse. This impulse 5 by its very nature may not always be evident publicly, but can 6 be experienced during private conversations. With many of 7 my young male respondents from the Bajrang Dal, stories of 8 rape were more like a fun story to share. The pleasure derived 9 from storytelling was more visible when discussing the sexual 10 degeneracy of Muslims.
This imagined 17 virility is used to construct an image of Muslim masculinity 18 that is marked by an uncontrolled and uncontrollable lust and 19 is hence a danger to Hindu women. Asexualizing the Hindu Self or at least disciplining sexu- 24 ality within Hindu nationalism accompanies a pornosexual- 25 izing of Muslim men and women. The hypersexuality of the Muslims 29 is seen as common sense within Hindu nationalism. Jokes about prolific, irrespon- 37 sible, indiscreet, and immoral sexuality of Muslims proliferate.
Muslim hypersexuality is ascribed to 2 religion, diet, culture, physicality, living pattern, and morality. Hypersexuality was presented as the obvious 8 explanation for Muslim overpopulation. Incest, sexual permis- 37 siveness and indiscretion, perversion—all these are imagined 38 onto the Muslim bodies. Excess is condemned as a vice here but 2 the manner in which it is narrated implies a pleasure drawn 3 out of the narration of the excess.
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Rejection of sexual pleasures 4 as a sign of immoral excess of Muslims went hand in hand 5 with unprompted indulgence in describing it. Such porno- 6 sexual imagining of Muslims allowed young male activists like 7 RD to derive pleasure through displacement. Muslim culture is said to be permissive even 21 when it may seem apparently more conservative. The overall picture 24 is of animality. This became clear during my conversation with PT and 37 half a dozen other male Hindu nationalist activists in the VHP 38 office.
The tone is one of salacious 11 gossip. The intention of Hindutva 16 ideologues is not to understand or analyze Islamic practices but 17 to present them selectively as illustrations of sexual immorality. SS revelled in attention as I noted down his 37 hate-filled stereotypes, which he saw as common sense. When I asked if SS or other activists standing around 8 him would mind if a Muslim family moves in as their neigh- 9 bor, all were united in their resolve not to let Muslims reside 10 in Hindu localities.
Body and 23 physicality militate against an easy distinguishing of Muslims 24 from Hindus. Sartorial practices may enable one to identify 25 Hindus from Muslims only if they are wearing what is seen as 26 traditional outfits. Difference of religion does not mark itself 27 on the corporeal identities, except in one way.
Circumcision 28 of the penis is not a common practice among Hindus while it 29 is religiously binding for Muslims. This minor difference gets 30 blown up in the rhetoric of Hindu nationalists when explain- 31 ing Muslim sexual politics. SS Personal Interview b 32 argued that circumcision is unnatural and increases the sex 33 drive of Muslim men.
A common slang used for Muslims in 34 North India was katua or kattu or katwa, infamously used 35 by BJP MP Varun Gandhi in an election campaign speech in 36 referring to one who is circumcised on stigmatization 37 of circumcised penis, see Mehta This reduces a Muslim 38 male to one of his body organs. It is this abnormality that makes the Muslim a 4 lurking rapist and a potential threat to Hindu women. It assures the Hindu 13 nationalist Self of its moral superiority; yet, at the same time, 14 it instils an anxiety about the threatening masculine Other.
This 20 fear clearly informed attempts by militant Hindutva organiza- 21 tions in to prohibit Muslim men from participating in 22 the Dandiya festival in parts of central India Indian Express 23 The anxiety about Muslim male sexuality among 24 young VHP and Bajrang Dal activists was a strong theme that 25 emerged out of my ethnographic fieldwork with them. Sociocultural organization and 3 political mobilization are answers to this anxiety.
Hindu 4 nationalism, despite being a majoritarian nationalism, has a 5 masculinist anxiety to which it claims to provide a solution 6 through a masculinist-nationalist awakening. Their role is of a 15 vanguard because the significant bulk of the Hindu population 16 they claim as their cultural constituency have never voted for 17 Hindu right-wing political parties. Most Hindus have kept away 18 from Hindu nationalism politically.
Hindutva blames this on 19 the influence of alien ideologies secularism, democracy, com- 20 munism , degenerate foreign ideas Westernization , political 21 opportunism non-Hindutva political parties are rejected as 22 opportunists who pander to minority and caste vote banks , and 23 divisive tactics of foreign religionists.
In fact, one can identify 13 a significant difference over the public presentation of selec- 14 tive elements of politics of fear. RSS writings and ideologues 15 focus more on how to organize Hindus as a nation and their 16 primary rationale is the perennial existence of a distinct Hindu 17 nation without always mentioning the minorities as enemies. Hindu nationalists have a fairly standardized 28 reply to this question—Hindus were not united. Historical figures that preached peace, negoti- 15 ated living with diversity, experimented with more humane 16 religious practices, or even promoted Hindu religion without 17 being antagonistic to Islam do not form part of the Hindu 18 nationalist iconography.
Patriotism is proven through violence. The endless divi- 22 sions and subdivisions among Hindus is ascribed to distortions 23 that are blamed on outsiders. Hindu nationalists encourage 24 Hindus to go beyond their caste affiliations and act as unified 25 Hindus—the negative portrayal of Muslims plays an impor- 26 tant role in facilitating intercaste solidarity against a common 27 enemy.
Hindu nationalism has had a complicated relationship 28 with caste, something that is not the focus here, and will require 29 an entirely new research project. Let me only mention a couple 30 of observations I made during my fieldwork. During my 2 personal session with the head of the Ram Janmabhumi Temple 3 movement, Nritya Gopal Das Personal Interview e , an 4 interesting incident occurred.
My name and surname does 5 not give away the caste I was born into. Assuming that I was 6 a Non Resident Hindu Indian a category that is often seen 7 as a constituency for Hindu nationalism , Das started with a 8 rehearsed tale of how Hindus and Muslims are brothers and if 9 only Muslims give away certain mosques, there will be harmony 10 in India. The views they expressed of other castes in whispered 18 tones was only slightly less pejorative as their views of Muslims 19 and Christians.
It is interesting to note that these private views 20 on caste do not usually get aired publicly; this is in contrast with 21 the public expression of private prejudices against Muslims. Allusions are made to the fact that the communist 6 political movement in India derived its ideological inspiration 7 from outside India and that communist politicians allegedly 8 received funding from the Soviet Union in the past and from 9 China nowadays. Communism is seen as anti-Hindu for divid- 10 ing people along class lines and thus disrupting harmony that 11 is supposedly a feature of Hindu society.
Fostering of class 12 consciousness and awareness of injustices within communities 13 threaten the Hindu nationalism idea of an organic Hindu soci- 14 ety. Communists are also seen as anti-Hindu because of their 15 progressive cultural politics. The rhetoric of the rights of the 16 marginalized raised by the Left is seen as divisive by Hindutva. There can be no secular 26 Muslims or genuine Indian nationalist Muslims for they are 27 those who stayed back to Islamize the rest of India Paliwal 28 This idea that Muslim elite who stayed in India after 29 did not do so out of love for the country or preference for 30 secular nationalism but because they wanted to Islamize the 31 whole of India was repeated to me by different Hindu national- 32 ist activists in many towns of north and west India.
For Hindu 33 nationalism, secular Muslim is an oxymoron. The first strand rejects the dominant strand of 14 secularism as pseudo-secularism and presents itself as genu- 15 ine secularism and Hindu Rashtra as truly secular Genuine 16 Secularism strand. Subramaniam Swamy in his Hindus Under 19 Siege: The second strategy is to reject secularism as alien, oppor- 22 tunistic, and anti-Hindu and argue for a full Hindu Rashtra 23 No Secularism strand.
It may be tempting to see these strands 24 as reflecting a tension within Hindu nationalism, as marking 25 a distinction between moderate and extremist Hindutva. If 11 we examine the details of the Genuine Secularism strand, we 12 see that their demands on the minorities, their prescription of 13 complete assimilation, will mean an erasure of all differences 14 and hence imply religious minorities becoming proto-Hindu.
If the Hindu nation is indeed secular and demo- 23 cratic, why change the Constitution of India to make India a 24 Hindu Rashtra? Seshadri, a Hindutva ideologue, has an answer 25 that appeals to the supposed nonpolitical national character of 26 the Hindu nation: In short, Hindu Rashtra is essentially cultural 31 and content, whereas the so called secular concept pertains to state and is limited to the territorial and political aspects of the 32 Nation.
State is just one of the instruments though a very vital 33 one created by the nation to serve its material needs. The nation 34 denotes the whole, while the state only a part. State represents 35 functions of the body part, while the culture represents those 36 of the mind and the intellect. It is to denote this whole of our 37 national entity that the word Hindu is used. Secularism for Hindu nationalism is part 8 of a conspiracy to undermine the Hindu character of India 9 by blinding Hindus to serious threats posed by Muslims and 10 Christians.
A pamphleteer exhorts the readers: Secularists in India, who argue for equal respect of all 25 religions, are rejected as self-hating Hindus who fail to recog- 26 nize the inherent superiority of Hindu Dharma.
Singhal, from 27 the VHP states it bluntly—Secularists are solely responsible for 28 disasters brought about by materialist and consumerist cultures 29 Singhal n. This reading of Indian nationalism damns postinde- 9 pendence India for being anti-Hindu. The ideals of secular- 10 ism, socialism, democracy, multiethnic nationalisms, unity 11 in diversity, and so on that the Indian state presents as the 12 strength of India, are all seen as anti-Hindu by the Hindu 13 nationalists.
Paliwal rejects progressive movements of 17 Dalits, women, and environmental protection as conspiracies 18 hatched by the Church to exacerbate Hindu disunity. Another example can be found with 23 VHP leader Ashok Singhal, who writes that an example of how 24 the secularist Congress government conspires to destroy the 25 backbone of Hindu society is the new law giving equal right to 26 daughters to paternal property Singhal n. Instead of see- 27 ing this as a step forward in empowerment of women or even 28 a validation of Hindus as more modern than other religious 29 communities in India, Singhal argues that the equal right to 30 property is a conspiracy of the Congress government to destroy 31 Hindu families by suffocating them within British-imposed 32 legal structure and thus make them amenable to attack by the 33 Church.
It asserts the right of the nation to 6 dictate how the state should function or how the state should 7 treat those who might be citizens of the state but not belong to 8 the nation, the minorities. It leaves only duties for the individu- 9 als. In this sense, majoritarian nationalism is by its very nature 10 illiberal. The residue of 15 Macaulayism Goel n. Parmananda, a Hindu religious 19 figure, attacked both the secularists for weakening Hindu soci- 20 ety and the media for westernizing innocent Hindu boys and 21 girls through sexually permissive images.
Singhal in his pamphlet argues that the Westernization 29 of electronic and print media, consciously or unconsciously, 30 is destroying Indian culture. The bulk of the media, especially English media, 35 is criticized as anti-Hindu. Most commentators in the leaflets 4 and tracts I have researched point toward the ills brought by 5 Westernization in general but never criticize Indian business 6 practices or the professional class that has benefited from 7 recent liberalization and globalization.
However, 13 it is difficult to take this apparent antimaterialism of Hindutva 14 at its face value. For it does not seek to provide any sustained or 15 well-thought out assessment of the role of business in a society. Most 21 Hindu nationalists remain pro-business and antiunionized 22 labor. Hindutva affiliated labor unions often work to create 23 divisions among workers. Many try to present Hindutva as a center-right 3 democratic movement or as being in favor of majority rule and 4 hence a genuine democracy.
With a sharp feminist eye for exactly how both femininities and masculinities are wielded, he provides lessons for all of us concerned about the mobilization of ethnic hatreds and militarized nationalisms. Making Feminist Sense of the Iraq War"Dibyesh Anand s book offers a sustained, innovative analysis of a central aspect of Hindu nationalist collective imaginings: It is a must-read for anyone interested in right-wing social and political movements and in the local-to-transnational conflict in which they are engaged.
In analyzing the politics of fear engendered within Hindu nationalism, this book confronts an issue that has, and will continue to have, great significance within India's political scene. Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Would you like to tell us about a lower price? If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? The representation of the Muslims as threatening to India's body politic is central to the Hindu nationalist project of organising a political movement and normalising anti-minority violence. Adopting a critical ethnographic approach, this book identifies the poetics and politics of fear and violence engendered within Hindu nationalism.
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